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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3) (j) . This matter was
assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) of
the Utah Code.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Appellees, Matt Mattson and Sherie Mattson (hereinafter
"Mattsons") disagree with the standards of review as presented
for the issues in Appellant Promax Development Corporation's
(hereinafter "Promax") appellant brief.
1.

Issue: Whether a valid contract existed between Defendants,
the Mattsons, and the potential buyers of the Mattsons'
home, the Johnsons.

Standard of Review:

Whether a

contract existed is a question of fact and the appellate
court will not overturn a trial court's factual findings
unless they are clearly erroneous.

Cal Wadsworth Constr. v.

City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995).

The

appellant must also marshall the evidence in favor of the
prevailing party and show the facts are clearly erroneous.
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 482 (Ut. App. 1993).
2.

Issue:

Assuming that no contract for sale existed between

the Mattsons and the Johnson, whether Promax tortiously
interfered with the sales contract between the Mattsons and

the Johnsons.

Standard of Review:

When questioning the

trial court's finding that a contract existed, a clearly
erroneous standard of appellate review applies, due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and the evidence
will be reviewed in a light most favorable to the trial
court's findings and affirmed if there is a reasonable basis
for doing so. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2nd 487
(Ut. App. 1993).

The appellant must marshall all the

evidence in support of the findings in order to demonstrate
the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings. Reinbold
v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 1993).
3.

Issue:

Whether acts of an individual can be construed as

tortiously interfering with a contract, assuming a counter
offer had expired.

Standard of Review:

When questioning

the trial court's finding that a contract existed, a clearly
erroneous standard of appellate review applies, due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and the evidence
will be reviewed in a light most favorable to the trial
court's findings and affirmed if there is a reasonable basis
for doing so.

Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2nd 487

(Ut. App. 1993).

The appellant must marshall all the

evidence in support of the findings in order to demonstrate
the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings. Reinbold

v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 1993).
Issue:

Whether a mechanic's lien was filed wrongfully.

Standard of Review:

When questioning the trial court's

finding that a lien was wrongfully filed, a clearly
erroneous standard of appellate review applies, due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and the evidence
will be reviewed in a light most favorable to the trial
court's findings and affirmed if there is a reasonable basis
for doing so. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2nd 487
(Ut. App. 1993).

The appellant must marshall all the

evidence in support of the findings in order to demonstrate
the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings.
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 1993).
Issue:

Whether the trial court properly refused to grant a

motion for a partial new trial.

Standard of Review:

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prevailing party, the Appellate Court must conclude that the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.
Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992).

Heslop v.

When the challenge

is an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, the
appealing party must marshall the evidence which supports
the verdict and show that it is insufficient to support the
verdict.
Issue:

Id.

Whether the trial court was clearly erroneous in

finding that the value of the Defendants' home was

$390,000.00.

Standard of Review:

When reviewing a trial

court's finding of fact, a clearly erroneous standard of
appellate review applies, due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses, and the evidence will be reviewed in a light
most favorable to the trial court's findings and affirmed if
there is a reasonable basis for doing so.

Reinbold v. Utah

Fun Shares, 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 1993).

The appellant

must marshall all the evidence in support of the findings in
order to demonstrate the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
findings. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut.
App. 1993).
7.

Issue:

Whether the trial court's judgment was supported by

the evidence.

Standard of Review:

When questioning the

trial court's finding of fact a clearly erroneous standard
of appellate review applies, due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses, and the evidence will be reviewed in a
light most favorable to the trial court's findings and
affirmed if there is a reasonable basis for doing so.
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 1993).
The appellant must marshall all the evidence in support of
the findings in order to demonstrate the evidence, including
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient
to support the findings. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850
P.2nd 487 (Ut. App. 1993).

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 59(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment from the Third District
Court of Utah, District Court Judge J. Dennis Frederick,
presiding.

Plaintiff, builder of Defendants7 home, sued

Defendants for breach of contract alleging that Defendants had
failed to pay the total cost of construction.

Defendant

counterclaimed for, among other things, breach of contract,
alleging cost over runs by Plaintiff and faulty workmanship, and
interference with contractual relationship, alleging tortious
interference by Plaintiff with a contract for sale of Defendants'
home to a third party.

Judge Frederick found in favor of

Defendants and awarded judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of
Defendants in the amount of $193,000.00, plus costs. The
judgment consisted of $170,000.00 for tortious interference with
contract (the difference between the value of the home at the
time of completion and the contract sales price to the third
party), and $23,000.00 for faulty workmanship.

Judge Frederick

did not award punitive damages or attorney's fees.

Plaintiffs

appeal from this judgment.
Although Judge Frederick found that a fixed cost contract
existed between Plaintiff and Defendants, he did not awarded
damages to Defendants for the difference between the contract
price ($192,000.00) and the price actually paid by Defendants

($330,000.00).

Defendant cross appeal from this failure of the

trial court to awarded damages.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
FACTS AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT
1.

Promax (hereinafter Plaintiff) is a Utah Corporation in good
standing in the State of Utah, and is in the business of
building homes and developing properties.

2.

Phil Bates was, at all times relevant to the facts in this
case, acting as Plaintiff's agent.

3.

R. 403.

R.

403.

In April, 1993, Phil Bates approached Defendants and
offered, on behalf of Plaintiff, to build a home for
Defendants.

4.

R. 403-04.

The contract price for building the home was $190,200.00—
plus $29,000.00, which equals one half the price of the
building lot.

5.

R. 404.

Culley Davis, Plaintiff's president, acknowledged in his
deposition that he was aware that the "basic price was about
$195,000.00," while at trial he insisted that the contract
was cost plus.

6.

R. 404.

Defendants obtained a construction loan from Far West Bank,
through Far West Bank's agent Mark Baraclaugh.

7.

R. 404.

Mark Baraclaugh, Promax' banker, testified that Defendant's
home was to be built for a certain dollar figure.

8.

R. 404.

Baraclaugh also testified that a cost plus building contract
was rare and that the bank would not have agreed to lend
Defendants' money had the home been given an open-ended
arbitrary price.

R. 404.

On April 15th, 1993, the loan was closed.

R. 404.

Plaintiff built the home and Defendants paid Plaintiff the
contract price with the monies obtained from Far West Bank.
R. 404.
Defendants were involved in the usual way in selecting
materials for their home.

R. 404.

As construction proceeded, Plaintiff did not properly pay
for all labor and materials as the contract required.

R

404-05.
As a direct result of Plaintiff's failure to properly pay
for those costs, and in order to avoid having liens placed
on their home, Defendants were forced to pay those costs
from their own funds in the amount of $140,000.00 dollars.
R. 405.
Defendants paid approximately $140,000.00 more than called
for due to Plaintiff's failure to keep them apprised of the
overage, thus breaching the contract.

R. 405.

Phil Bates told Defendants throughout the building project
that Defendant's were within their budget.

R. 405.

Plaintiff was paid in full for all materials and labor
supplied to or performed on Defendants home.
Defendants owe Plaintiff nothing.

R. 405.

R. 405.

The value of the home, when finished, was $390,000.00.

R.

405.
While the home was being built, Plaintiff never obtained any
change orders from Defendants.

R. 405.

While the home was being built, Plaintiff never told

Defendants of any cost over runs.
21.

R. 405.

When the home was completed, Defendants received an offer
from a ready, willing and able buyer, to purchase the home
for $560,000.00 dollars.

22.

R. 405.

Plaintiff, through agent Phil Bates, represented to various
third persons that Plaintiff was Defendants' selling agent.
R. 405.

23.

Defendants told Bates that Plaintiff was not allowed to act
as their selling agent.

24.

R.

406

Plaintiff, through Bates, told Defendants that Plaintiff
"would kill their deal" if they did not use Plaintiff as
their real estate agent in the sale of their home.

25.

Defendants refused to allow Plaintiff to act as selling
agent.

26.

R. 406.

R. 406.

Because of Defendant's proper refusal to allow Plaintiff to
act as agent in the sale of Defendant's home, Bates and
Plaintiff had five material men and laborers wrongfully file
liens against Defendant's home to scare off the buyer.

R.

406.
27.

These wrongfully filed liens were the sole reason that the
buyer suddenly backed out of the contract to buy Defendant's
home.

28.

R. 406.

As a direct result of Plaintiff's wrongfully liening
Defendant's home, Defendants suffered $170,000.00 in
damages, because of the loss of sale.

29.

R. 406.

On two other occasions Bates engaged in the so-called costplus versus fixed price bait and switch action.

Rick and

Martha Riley testified that after Bates' involvement with
Defendants, they had Bates in 1993, build their home with
the understanding that they had a fixed price agreement of
$300,000.00.

There was no written agreement.

After the

Rileys paid their $300,000.00, Bates demanded an additional
$160,000.00 for extras.

The Rileys finally paid Bates an

additional $30,000.00 just to be rid of the problem.

Bates

had threatened the Rileys that if they did to him what the
Mattsons did, he would "burn them" as he had the Mattsons.
R. 406-07.
Selva Kumaraa testified that Bates built his home before
March of 1994. After closing, when everything was paid,
Bates demanded more money.

He harassed Kumaraa to the point

where Kumaraa paid him an additional $600.00—again to get
rid of the problem.

Exhibit 57 is the cancelled check

endorsed by Phil Bates dated August 12th, 1994.

The Kumaraa

budget was for $100,000.00 and the overage was an additional
$13,000.00.

There was again no written contract.

R. 407.

Plaintiff gave Defendants a one year warranty for anything
that might go wrong with their home relating to anything
built on their home, while Plaintiff was the general
contractor.

R. 407.

After Plaintiff completed Defendants7 home, numerous
deficiencies appeared which were brought to Bate's
attention, Exhibit 67, within the one-year warranty period.
With the exception of the faulty rain gutters, nothing was
corrected.

The costs of repairs is $23,000.00.

Defendant

have paid the various overages and the lien holders,
Exhibits 58 and 62, which are the lien waivers.

R. 407-08.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court found that after Plaintiff had completed the
construction of the Mattsons' home, that the Mattsons found a
buyer, the Johnsons.

The Court found that the Mattsons and the

Johnsons entered into a contract for sale, where the Johnsons
agreed to purchase the Mattsons' home for $560,000.00.

The Court

found that Phil Bates, Promax's agent, had five material men and
laborers wrongfully file liens against Defendant's home to scare
off the buyer.

These wrongfully filed liens were the sole reason

that the buyer suddenly backed out of the contract to buy
Defendant's home. As a direct result of Plaintiff's wrongfully
liening Defendant's home, Defendants suffered $170,000.00 in
damages, because of the loss of sale.

On appeal, and for the

first time, Plaintiff's asserts that the sales contract between
the Mattsons and the Johnsons never existed, and that, therefore,
there could have been no tortious interference by Bates with the
sales contract.

The evidence presented at trial, however,

overwhelmingly supports the trial court's finding that a sales
contract between the Mattsons and the Johnsons did exists.

In

fact, Plaintiff never challenged the existence of the sales
contract at trial.

Furthermore, Plaintiff misstates the standard

of review in its brief, and fails to marshall the evidence as
required when challenging a trial court's finding.

The evidence

at trial was so overwhelming, and unchallenged, that it would
have been an abuse of discretion had the trial court concluded

that not contract existed.

The trial court's finding, therefore,

was not clearly erroneous and should be affirmed.
The sales contract between the Mattsons and the Johnsons was
in writing.

The contract, however, when presented at trial was

not complete; several pages were missing.

The completeness of

the contract for sale was supported by Mr. Mattson's testimony,
which Plaintiff never challenged at trial.

On appeal, and for

the first time, Plaintiff argues that, because the actual
contract presented at trial was incomplete, the contract was not
in writing and, therefore, violates the statute of frauds.

In

its brief, Plaintiff again misstates the standard of review and
fails to marshall the evidence.

But more important, Plaintiff

failed to raise the affirmative defense of statue of frauds in
its pleadings, or at trial.
affirmative defense.

Plaintiff, therefore, waived that

Moreover, even if there had been no

contract, the trial court could have found that Plaintiff
interfered with Defendants' economic relations, and the resulting
judgment would have been the same.

The trial court's finding,

therefore, was not clearly erroneous, and should be affirmed.
The trial court found that Phil Bates, Promax's agent,
tortiously interfered with Defendants' sales contract by having
five material men and laborers wrongfully file liens against
Defendant's home to scare off the buyer.

These wrongfully filed

liens were the sole reason that the buyer suddenly backed out of
the contract to buy Defendant's home.

On appeal, and for the

first time, Plaintiff argues that the liens could not have been
wrongfully filed because Plaintiff's had not first made a demand

for payment.

Again, Plaintiff misstates the standard of review

and fails to marshall the evidence.

Furthermore, Plaintiff fails

to comprehend that the trial court did not rely on the mechanics
lien statute but on the common law claim of tortious interference
with contract.

Had the trial court relied on the statute, treble

damages would have resulted.

The trial court found that filing

the liens against the Mattsons' home was the act that constituted
the tortious interference with the Mattsons sale contract.

The

evidence at trial supported the trial court's finding that the
liens were filed in order to scare off the buyer.

The trial

court's finding, therefore, was not clearly erroneous and should
be affirmed.
The trial court found that the wrongfully filed liens were
the sole reason that the buyer suddenly backed out of the
contract to buy Defendant's home.

Plaintiff argues that this is

not true and relies on affidavits submitted after the trial.
Plaintiff accuses Defendant Matt Mattson of perjury but, again,
fails to marshall the evidence.

The evidence at trial, including

Phil Bates admission, supported the trial court's finding that
Bates had the liens filed to prevent the Mattsons from selling
their home to the Johnsons.

The trial court's finding,

therefore, was not clearly erroneous, and should be affirmed.
The trial court found that the value of the Mattsons' home,
at the time of completion, was $390,000.00.

The trial court also

found that the Mattsons had a ready and willing buyer, the
Johnsons, who had contracted to purchase their home for
$560,000.00.

The trial court found that Promax committed

tortious interference of contract by filing liens against the
Mattsons home and scaring off the Johnsons.

The trial court

awarded judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of the Mattsons
in the amount of $170,000.00, the difference between the value at
time of completion and the sales contract price.

On appeal, and

for the first time, Plaintiff argues that the trial court's
finding that the value of the home was $390,000.00 was in error,
that the home was actually worth much more, and that the
judgment, therefore was excessive.

Plaintiff bases this argument

on the fact that Mattson testified that his home was worth about
$380,000.00 at the time of completion, and that Mattson could not
be a credible witness.

Plaintiff also relies on Utah State Road

Commission v. Johnson, 550 P2d. 216, 220 (Utah 1976) for the
proposition that a homeowner is not competent to testify
regarding the value of his own home.
misstates the holding of that case.
held that a homeowner was competent

However, Plaintiff
The Court in Utah actually

to testify regarding the

value of his home if he was familiar with the facts which gave
the property value.

The evidence presented at trial demonstrates

that Mattson was intimately involved with the construction of his
home.

The trial court states that Mattson was acting a co-

contractor.

Furthermore, the trial court did not rely

exclusively on Mattsons testimony.

Even Plaintiff's own

witnesses agreed with Mattson on the value of the home at the
time of completion.

Moreover, Plaintiff has again misstated the

standard of review and has failed to marshall the evidence.

The

evidence presented at trial was unchallenged and supported the

trial court's finding•

The trial court's finding was not clearly

erroneous and should be affirmed.
The trial court found that the contract price for building
Defendants7 home was $190,200.00—plus $29,000.00, which equals
one half the price of the building lot.

On appeal, Plaintiff

asserts that the contract was a cost-plus contract.

Plaintiff

again misstates the standard of review and fails to marshall the
evidence.

The only evidence presented in its brief are

affidavits obtained after the trial was over.

The evidence at

trial supported the trial court's finding and it should be
affirmed.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court's judgment is not
supported by the evidence.

Plaintiff again misstates the

standard of review and fails to marshall the evidence.

This

final argument is redundant, irrelevant or diminimus and should
not be considered by the Court.
After the trial, Plaintiff requested a new trial, which was
denied.

Plaintiff misstates the standard of review and fails to

marshall the evidence, again.

The trial court's findings were

supported by substantial evidence at trial.

The "new" evidence

which Plaintiff sought to introduce at a new trial could have
been presented at trial, but Plaintiff chose not to.

The trial

court was well within its discretion in not granting a new trial.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT FOUND THAT THERE EXISTED A CONTRACT FOR SALE
BETWEEN MATTSONS AND BUYER AND THAT PHIL BATES, PROMAX'S
AGENT, TORTIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH THAT CONTRACT.
Promax alleges that there was no valid contract between

Mattsons and Curtis Johnson because there was no acceptance of
the offer from Curtis Johnson.
reasons:

This argument fails for three

(1) Promax misstates the standard of review.

Promax is

challenging a finding of fact and not a question of law.

A trial

court's finding of fact cannot be set aside unless it is found to
be clearly erroneous.

(2) When challenging a trial court's

finding of fact (in this case:

that a contract did exist)

Plaintiff's are required to marshall the evidence on appeal, and
they have failed to do so.

(3)

Promax's assertion that a

contract for sale never existed is being raised for the first
time on appeal, and may not, therefore, be presented to this
Court.

(4) Even if the Court were to consider Promax's assertion

that a contract never existed, the only evidence presented at
trial supported the trial Court's finding that a contract did
exist; the existence of a contract was never challenged.

For the

Court to have concluded otherwise would have been an abuse of
discretion.
Promax alleges that as a matter of law there was no contract
because it wasn't accepted.

However, Promax fails to provide any

case law to support its position and has misstated the standard
of review.

The question of whether a contract exists or not is a

question of fact:
A trial court's finding about whethei a party
accepted an offer or a counteroffer is a

finding of fact. We cannot overturn a trial
court's factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly
erroneous if it is "against the clear weight
of evidence, or if the appellate court
otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made."
Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. Citv of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah
1995) .
Additionally, the appellant must marshall the evidence in
favor of the prevailing party and show the facts are clearly
erroneous. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 482 (Ut. App.
1993).

Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence and has

cited to no evidence to support its assertion that a contract did
not exist.
This argument is now presented to the appellate court for
the first time and was not brought before the trial court.

It is

well established that: "matters not put in issue before the trial
court may not be raised for the first time on appeal" Wade v.
Stangl, 869 P.2nd 232 (Ut. App. 1994).

The Court, therefore,

need not consider Promax/s argument.
The trial court did find that there existed a contract for
sale between Mattsons and the buyer Curtis Johnson.
409).

(R. 403-

Promax never, at any time, challenged the existence of a

contract for sale.

The only evidence presented at trial was that

there did exist a contract for sale, for example:
1.

Phil Bates, Plaintiff's agent, testified:
a.
"...we were able to obtain a purchaser..." (R. 514,
L17-20).
b.
"I am aware of an offer..." (R. 511, L25).
c.
Q. "In your deposition you say that you had a buyer
ready, willing and able to buy Matt Mattson's home,
correct?" A. "I did not, but another agent did, yes."
Q. "You did not say that you had a ready, willing and

able buyer for Matt Mattson'S home in your deposition?"
A." May have said. I did that, but it was representing
as we agreed on the Listing <3f the home and I was at
that point ready to submit an offer in writing." COURT:
"You've lost me." WITNESS: "yeah." THE COURT: "Why
don't you listen to the guestion and answer the
guest ion. Did you say that or didn't you say that?" THE
WITNESS: "I believe I did." (R- 536, L8-21).
d.
Q. (By Mr. Smith) "Okay. Did you see this ~ what
appears to be a contract for the sale of a home for
$565,000 by a company that you are affiliated with,
broker? A. "I have seen it [the contract] after the
sale did not go through." (R. 546 L15-18).
e.
Q. "Did you ever say to Laurie Gale, 'This deal's not
going to close because I burned it by liening it,
liening the property'?" A. "Not in those words, no."
(R. 547, L16-19).
f.
"If I was going to represent that house as a listing
agent, yes, I would have been entitled to a
commission." (R. 548, L13-15)•
g.
"I was angry with Matt when he wouldn't sign a listing
agreement which we verbally agreed to and before the
offer was. presented, X believe- that, offer was. ores.eivted
to him on a Monday." (R. 559, L13-16).
h.
Q. "Well, when the home was finished, wasn't the
market value of the home $450,000.00?" A. "We, I
believe, had an offer for five — what do you show —
565?" Q. "Five Sixty Five." A. "What somebody's
willing to pay us, that would be what it's worth . .
." (R. 586 L3-9).
i.
Q. "...In your deposition you said that you had a
buyer who was ready, willing and able to buy Mr.
Mattson's home, correct?" A. "I had one presented to me
that I represented to Mattson to our earlier
conversation." Q. "Right, but that person, the words
you used were ready, willing and able, correct?" A. "I
believe, yes." Q. "And that was a person who made the
$550,000 offer, correct?" A. "Yes." (R. 732, L19-R.
733-4)
Martha Riley testified:
a.
Phil Bates admitted to Martha Riley that Matt had sold
his home and that Phil had "burned the deal." (R. 59899, "R. 609) .
Matt Mattson testified:
a.
Q. "Now, during the Parade of Homes, do you know if
there was a person who wanted to buy your home?" A.
"Yes." Q. Do you know what that person's name was?" A.
"It was Curtis Johnson.." (R. 645, L18-22).
b.
Phil Bates admitted to Mr Mattson: "I told you if you
don't pay me the commission, I'd kill your deal." (R.
651, L12-13).
c.
Q. (Mr. Braunberger) "Was there a signed addendum where
you agreed to things?" A. "There may have been s o — "
Q. "What was the final agreement? You'd sell for a

hundred and fifty thousand?" A. "Five hundred and
fifty." Q. "Five hundred and fifty thousand without
furniture?" A. "Correct, yeah, that was the
difference." Mr. Braunberger: "Your Honor, may I see
that exhibit?" The Court: "Yes you may." Q. "I show
you paragraph no. 1 where it lists matt Mattson and
Promax as sellers." A. "Uh-huh (affirmative)." Q.
Can you explain that? A. Yeah. Actually, Phil Bates
tried to sell my home to this Mr. Johnson, somehow
claiming it was his home. He'd actually stipulated on
page 3 that he was the — representing that he had a
written agreement to sell the home, so I did not fill
any of this in at all. Q. Is that cleared up in
subsequent documents you don't have with you today?"
A. It may have been. It probably was. In fact, in
fact, I thought they had scratched it out so — " (R.
698 L21 to R. 699-L19).
d.
Q. "Relating to the sale to Curtis Johnson, did you
ever sign the Earnest Money Agreement?" A. "YES" Q.
"Was there a counter offer?" A. "From him there was a
counter offer, yes." Q. "Did you accept that counter
offer?" A. "We did, yes." Q. "So you had a binding
contract?" A. "I guess so, Yes." (R. 696 L23-697-L6).
4.
Culley Davis, Plaintiff's agent testified:
a.
A. "Well, we had a purchaser for 440(sic) grand, but he
didn't want to pay the commission fee to my partner of
that and that fell through, too." (R766, L24 to 767Ll) .
The trial court found there was sufficient evidence to show that
a contract existed.

In fact, the only evidence presented at

trial supported the Court's finding; Plaintiff never challenged
the existence of the sales contract at trial.

For the trial

court to have concluded that a contract did not exist, would have
been an abuse of discretion.

The Court's finding that a contract

for sale existed between the Mattsons and the Johnsons should
not, therefore, be set aside.
II.

PROMAX WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF STATUTE OF FRAUDS BY FAILING TO
PLEAD IT.
Promax's next argument is in three parts:

(1)

Promax

asserts that the written sales contract between the Mattsons and
the Johnsons, when introduced into evidence at trial, was missing
an addendum; therefore, according to Promax, a written contract

never existed.

(2) Promax then relies on the statute of frauds

asserting that because there was no written

contract, the

contract between the Mattsons and the Johnsons was invalid.

(3)

Promax then asks the Court to conclude that the trial court erred
in finding that Bates tortiously interfered with the contract
because the contract did not exist.

Promax's three part argument

fails at all three levels.
First, as noted above, the trial court found that a written
contract did exist.

The only evidence at trial supported the

trial court's finding, and the existence of the contract was
never challenged.

Furthermore, Promax has failed to marshall the

evidence supporting its assertion.

Also, this issue is being

raised for the first time on appeal; the Appellate Court cannot
consider a matter which was not first brought before the trial
court (Point I,

supra).

Second, the affirmative defense of statute of frauds must be
pleaded or it is waived.

Rule 8(c), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

states:
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively . . . statute
of frauds . . . and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense.
See also; W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 264,
470 P.2d 252 (1970)(not pleading statute of frauds does not
constitute a defense).

In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
[T]he affirmative defense of the statute of
frauds is being raised for the first time in
this appeal, it was never pled below. This
constitutes a violation of Rule 8(c) . . .

The consequence of this procedural error is
set forth in Rule 12(L), Utah R. Civ. P.
which states that "[a] party waives all
defenses and objections which he does not
present either by motion . . . [or] in his
answer or reply . . . "
Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983)(second
bracket in original, third elipses in original, emphasis in
original).

Promax failed to raise the affirmative defense of

statute of frauds in its pleading, or at trial, and therefore
waived that defense.
Promax alleges that it was not required to plead the
affirmative defense, statute of frauds, in its answer to
Mattsons' counterclaim because "ProMax was unaware that a written
agreement existed or, that if a written agreement did exists,
that is was defective."
statement is untrue.
82.

(Appellant's brief at p.21)

This

Mattsons' counterclaim specifically states:

On August 28, 1993, Curtis Johnson ("the
buyer"), the President of Dynatek Sales
and Leasing, made a written offer of
$565,000 for the home and all its
furnishings.
* * *

103. The realtors and Mr. Mattson also signed
the offer for the house.
(R. )(emphasis added).

To now argue that ProMax was unaware of a

written contract is blatant misrepresentation of the facts.

Even

if ProMax was unaware that a "written contract" existed, they at
least knew that some kind of contract existed, and were therefore
required to plead the statute of frauds as a defense.

Having

failed to do so, they have therefore waived that defense.
trial court's finding that a contract for sale existed,

The

therefore, should be affirmed.
Third, and finally, even if there had never been a written
contract, and even if Plaintiff had raised the issue of statute
of frauds in its pleadings, the trial court could have found,
based on the evidence at trial, that plaintiff's actions
constituted tortious interference with prospective economic
relations, resulting in an identical judgment.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff had its material men
purposely file liens on Defendants' property so as to "burn their
deal."

Even if there were no written contract, Plaintiff's

behavior constituted tortious interference with prospective
business advantage.

The resulting judgment would have been the

same.
In Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company v. T. Richard Isom
Richard's Fine Furnishings, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), the
defendant had recovered against plaintiff based on the theory of
interference with contract.

On appeal the Supreme Court found

that no contract existed and that the award could not be affirmed
on the theory of interference with contract.

However, the Court

did sustain the award on the theory of interference with
advantageous economic relations.

In so doing the Court stated:

However, the right of action for interference with a
specific contract is but one instance, rather than the total
class, of protections against wrongful interference with
advantageous economic relations. [citations omitted]. We
therefore proceed to consider whether the jury's verdict for
Isom can be sustained on the basis of the related tort of
interference with prospective economic relations.
If so, we can affirm the judgment. Consistent with the
well-settled principle that the appellant has the burden of
demonstrating that any error has affected his substantial
rights, Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631,

636, 237 P.2d 834. 836 (1951), we follow the authorities
that exercise every reasonable presumption in favor of the
validity of a general verdict.
In the extant case, the lack of a written contract would not have
affected the outcome of the judgment.

The elements for

prevailing under the theory of interference with prospective
economic relations are:
We recognize a common-law cause of action for intentional
interference with prospective economic relations, and adopt
the Oregon definition of this tort. Under this definition,
in order to recover damages, the plaintiff must prove (1)
that the defendant intentionally interfered with the
plaintiff's existing or potential economic relations, (2)
for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing
injury to the plaintiff.
Id.

The facts of this case clearly meet the requirements of the

above test.

Phil Bates, agent for Promax, "burned the deal."

Whether there was a written contract is irrelevant to the outcome
of the case.

The Court's findings conclusions and judgment

should, therefore, be affirmed.
III.

THE OFFER DID NOT EXPIRE PRIOR TO PROMAX TORTIOUSLY
INTERFERING WITH MATTSONS' CONTRACT FOR SALE, AND
PLAINTIFF RELIES ON FACTS NOT FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Promax's next argument relies on facts never asserted at

trial and never found by the trial court to be true.

Promax

asserts (1): "Mr. Johnson's offer to purchase the Mattson's home
expired on August 30, 1993, without being accepted by the
Mattsons" (Appellant's brief p.21); and (2) "Not only did Mr.
Johnson, the prospective purchaser, testify in his affidavit that
the liens were not the cause of the failed sale . . . "
(Appellant's brief p.22). Not only did the court never find these
facts to be true, but Mr. Johnson never testified at trial, nor
did he submit an affidavit at trial.

Promax's assertions are a

blatant misrepresentation of the facts presented at trial.
Furthermore, as already shown above, the trial court found
that a contract existed (Point I, supra).

Promax's argument,

therefore, fails.
IV.

THE MECHANIC'S LIENS WERE INVALID AND IMPROPER.
Promax also argues, again for the first time on appeal, that

the liens were not filed improperly because the liens were filed
according to statute.

The appellate court cannot consider a new

issue on appeal (Point 1, supra).

In making this argument,

Promax also misstates the standard of review.

Promax believes

the issue of a mechanic's lien is a question of law, when their
issue is really questioning the trial court's findings of fact.
The trial court's findings regarding the wrongfully filed liens
were:
24.

26.

Plaintiff, through Bates, told
Defendants that Plaintiff "would kill
their deal" if they did not use
Plaintiff as their real estate agent in
the sale of their home. . . .
Because of Defendant's proper refusal to
allow Plaintiff to act as agent in the
sale of Defendant's home, Bates and
Plaintiff had five material men and
laborers wrongfully file liens against
Defendant's home to scare off the buyer.

(R. 406)(emphasis added).

The trial court's findings were not

that the liens were filed improper according to statute, but that
the liens were wrongfully filed because it was done with the
intent to interfere with a contractual relationship between
Mattsons and Curtis Johnson.

The trial court found the liens

wrongful because the filing of the liens "were the sole reason
that the buyer suddenly backed out of the contract to buy

Mattsons's home." (R. 406).
Again, Promax is questioning the findings of fact and the
proper approach for appellate review was well explained by the
Utah Court of Appeals:
When an appellant is essentially challenging
the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a
clearly erroneous standard of appellate
review applies. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a) provides: "Findings of fact, whether
oral or documentary shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses." "A finding attacked as lacking
adequate evidentiary support is deemed
'clearly erroneous' only if we conclude that
the finding is against the clear weight of
the evidence." We review the evidence in a
light most favorable to the trial court's
findings and affirm if there is a reasonable
basis for doing so. A prerequisite to an
appellant's attack on findings of fact is the
requirement that appellant marshall all the
evidence in support of the findings in order
to demonstrate "that the evidence, including
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings."
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2nd 487 (Ut. App.
1993)(emphasis added).

Promax has failed to marshall the

evidence to show that the trial court's decision was erroneous.
Further, a review of the testimony and evidence at trial shows
the trial court's decision was sound:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Mattson's testimony that Bates would
kill the deal, and later admitted to
Mattson that he did (R. 649-651).
Riley's testimony that Bates would kill
Mattson's deal and would do the same to
her (R. 598-99).
Bates' testimony that he did "burn the
deal," but not in those words (R. 547).
Testimony that the liens were filed in
sequential order, and on the same form
(R. 537-38).
Testimony that the claim to such liens were

already paid, and lien waivers obtained, (R. 652).
Based on such evidence, the trial court's finding that Promax
wrongfully filed the liens is not erroneous, and Promax7s
argument fails because it is a new issue on appeal, the facts
have not been marshalled, and the standard of review is improper.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT PHIL BATES DID
CAUSE THE SALE TO FAIL BY TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
Promax argues that Curtis Johnson did not back out of the

contract because of liens filed by Mr. Bates; however, this
argument is again brought for the first time on appeal. The
appellate court cannot consider an issue not brought before the
trial court (Point I, supra).

In support of this assertion,

Promax relies on affidavits submitted after

the trial, from

biased witness, which were submitted in support of Promax's
motion for a new trial. An affidavit of Curtis Johnson and
testimony of Curtis Johnson was never presented at trail.
Further, Promax alleges that Mattson perjured his testimony
and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to hear any
additional evidence (See Point IX, infra).

Promax is again

arguing about the trial court's findings, and that such findings
are erroneous (See Point III, supra).

Promax has failed to

marshall the evidence on this issue and merely restates evidence
supporting their position even though it was not presented at
trial.

Reviewing the evidence at trial shows the trial court did

not erroneously decide that Bates caused the sale to fail:
1.
2.

Bates' testimony that he did "burn the
deal," but not in those words (R. 547).
Riley's testimony that Bates would kill
Mattson's deal and would do the same to
her (R. 598-600).

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Mattson's testimony there was a willing
and able buyer (R. 645)•
Mattson's testimony that Bates admitted
he killed the deal (R.650-51).
Bates7 testimony that there was a
willing and able buyer (R. 732-33).
Testimony that the sale did not go
through because of fear of the liens and
litigation (R. 598-99).
Culley Davis' testimony that the deal
fell through because a commission wasn't
paid to Mr. Bates (R. 766).

The evidence as outlined shows a clear basis for the trial court
to find that Mr. Bates did cause the sale of the home to fail.
Promax has failed to marshall such evidence and their argument
does not stand, and the trial court's findings should be
affirmed.
VI.

THE COURT AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS NOT EXCESSIVE, BUT WAS FAR
BELOW WHAT MATTSONS SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED.
Promax argues that the trial court's awarded of $170,000.00

for tortious interference with contract was excessive because the
court erred in finding that the value of the home was $390,000.
Promax's argument fails for the following reasons: (1) Promax has
again misstated the standard of review.

Promax is challenging a

finding of fact (that the value of the home upon completion was
$390,000) and not a question of law.

A trial court's finding of

fact cannot be set aside unless it is found to be clearly
erroneous. (Point IV, supra).

(2) When challenging a trial

court's finding of fact, Plaintiff is required to marshall the
evidence on appeal, and Plaintiff has failed to do so. (Point IV,
supra).

(3) All of the evidence presented at trial supports the

court's finding, and there is none to the contrary.

(4) Even if

the only evidence presented at trial was Mattson's testimony, it

was the court's prerogative to believe him, and his detailed
involvement with the construction of his home allowed the court
to rely on his testimony.
Among the evidences presented to the court regarding the
value of the home at the time of completion are the following:
1.

2.

3.

4*

Bates testified that he signed an
insurance contract listing the completed
value of the home at $330,000. (R. 585)
(Exhibit 29) .
Culley Davis testified that the home was
worth twice the amount of the mortgage
(R. 766), and the mortgage amount was
$190,200 (R. 455, 637).
Bates testified that he insured the home
at a value of $165,000 even after the
home was completed on August 15, 1993
(R.580-81).
Mattson's testimony that the value of
the home was probably $390,000 or
$395,000 at the time of completion (R.
678-79).

Promax never challenged the value of the home at trial.

In fact,

Promax's witnesses all agreed that the value was approximately
$390,000.00.

Issues presented for the first time on appeal may

not be considered by the Court.

Now on appeal, Promax brings

these issues to the appellate court, for the first time, which
cannot be decided on appeal.

Plaintiff argues that Mattson only

gave the actual cost of building the house and did not include
cost-savings; however, the argument is irrelevant because the
evidence shows testimony was about the value of the home and not
the cost.

Further, Promax states as evidence figures which were

never brought before the trial court, figures never testified or
brought by affidavit until Promax's motion for a partial new
trial.

Promax never shows that the trial court's decision was

clearly erroneous based on the evidence presented at trial.

Next, Promax argues that Mattson was not qualified to give
an evaluation of the value of the property.

However, this is a

finding of fact, supported by the case in which Promax cites
stating an owner may not be able to give an opinion as to value,
unless he is familiar with facts which give the property value.
(Appellant's Brief at p.26).

Phil Bates himself states for pages

of the trial transcript that Mattson was heavily involved with
the building process; for example:
Q. How was Matt Mattson involved in the
construction of this home which would be
something in addition to what you'd have in a
case where someone's just picking colors or
things like that? A. Matt was involved more
than the normal home buyer at the very first
on input from the plans . . .
(R. 716), and the trial court recognized this testimony that
Mattson was basically a co-contractor(R. 718). The trial court
also stated:
[Mattson] can testify
own property . . . He
be based on a variety
owner, he can tell us
the value is.

as to the value of his
has an opinion. It can
of factors. As the
what his opinion as to

(R. 678). Promax essentially seeks to have the trial court's
finding set aside simply because they disagree with the value
stated by Mattson.

However, no evidence suggests the trial court

abused its discretion in believing Mattson's testimony regarding
the home's value.
VII.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY POUND THAT A FIXED COST
CONTRACT EXISTED BETWEEN PROMAX AND MATTSONS.
Promax asserts that the trial court erred in finding that a

fixed cost contract existed between Promax and Mattsons.
Promax's argument fails for the following reasons: (1) Promax

again fails to properly present that there was an erroneous
decision by the trial court, and they do not marshall the
evidence for proper review (Point IV, supra); (2) the evidence
before the trial court shows the trial court did not make an
erroneous decision that a fixed cost contract existed; and (3)
Promax again states evidence which was never before the trial
court for the court to consider, and a new issue before the
appellate court may not be determined (Point I, supra).
Promax basically restates the evidence which supports their
position, they fail to marshall any evidence, and at one point
state: ,fIn sum, the trial court took Mr. Mattson's word over Mr.
Bates' word and Mr Barraclough's testimony" (Appellant brief
p. 33).

Promax fails to recognize that their statement is exactly

the court's prerogative in determining facts.

The Utah Supreme

Court stated that when there is conflicting testimony: "it [is]
the prerogative of the trial court to choose whom [it] will
believe" Riaale v. Daines MFG. Co., 463 P.2d 1 (Utah 1969);
further, the trial court "defers to the 'advantaged position of
the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses."

Parks

Enters., Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918 (Utah
1982).

In this case, the trial court made it clear whose

testimony the court believed by stating:
The testimony presented on behalf of the
plaintiff is too inconsistent and
contradictory to be persuasive. Based upon
the foregoing, as well as other evidence
produced at trial, this Court finds that the
parties had a fixed price contract for
$190,200 . . .
(R. 778). The other evidence produced at trial included:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Baraclough's testimony there was a
certain dollar figure, and that his
testimony had change in court versus a
telephone conversation (R. 479-80).
Riley's testimony that in a similar
transaction Bates promised a fixed price
contract, then charged additional
amounts (R. 600-601).
Kumaraa's testimony that in a similar
transaction Bates promised a fixed price
contract, then charged additional
amounts (R.613-14).
Mattson's testimony he received a loan
for the total cost of the home, $190,200
(R.637-38), that he was told the price
would never be over $190,200 (R.642),
and that he was assured by Bates that
they would not go above budget (R. 643).
Testimony that a specific price was in
mind, about $190,200 (R. 755-56).

Reviewing the testimony shows the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining a fixed price contract existed between
Mattson and Promax.

Promax also tries to bring additional

evidence that was never before the trial court, except after
trial in a motion for a new trial (Point IX, infra), and
therefore this new issue should be disregarded by the appellate
court, and the findings of the trial court be affirmed.
VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.

Promax next argues in Points A through L that the findings
of the trial court are not supported by the evidence.

However,

Promax's argument fails for the following reasons: (1) Promax
again fails to properly prepare the argument for appellate review
by not marshalling the evidence and showing the findings to be
clearly erroneous; (2) the point were already brought up earlier
in their brief and properly address by Mattsons; and (3) the
issues are irrelevant, or at most de minimis, to the outcome of

the trial court's decision.
Point A:

States the trial court misstated the construction

cost by one-half of the lot price.

This point is irrelevant

because the trial court's damages are based on the home7 value,
not the cost.
Point B:
contract.

States Mattsons did not request a written

This argument is irrelevant, and Promax makes no point

to this argument.
Point C. D, F, G, H, I and K have already been addressed.
Point E:

States that change orders need not be written.

This argument is irrelevant to the outcome of the trial court.
Point J;

States there was an error in cost overruns.

This

issue is irrelevant and moot because the amended findings cleared

I
up the discrepancy.
Point L:

States there was no stipulation to cost overruns.

However, there was no counter-evidence presented at trial, and
Promax fails to marshall any evidence to show how the trial
court's decision is clearly erroneous.
IX.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PROMAX'S MOTION FOR A
PARTIAL NEW TRIAL TO TAKE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.
Promax argues they are entitled to present additional

evidence which was not presented at trial because they filed
their motion timely; and because the motion should be granted
because Mattson perjured his testimony, that Promax did not see
the Earnest Money Agreement before trial, that Mattsons'
counterclaim was too long, because Promax feels the damages are
excessive, and because their evidence justifies a partial new
trial.

Promax's argument fails for the following reasons: (1)

Promax fails to establish the appropriate standard of review for
the appellate court, and marshall the evidence to justify their
argument; (2) The findings of the trial court, as established in
above arguments, show there is a substantial basis for the court
to believe Mattson's testimony; and (3)

Promax had the

opportunity to bring evidence, pursue discovery, and prepare
their defense to Mattson's counterclaim before the trial came to
a close.
When appealing a trial court's denial of a motion for a new
trial, the appellate court will:
[R]everse only iff viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, we conclude that the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict. When a
challenge to the denial of [a motion for new
trial] amounts to an attack on the
sufficiency of the evidence, the appealing
party 'must marshall the evidence in support
of the verdict and then demonstrate that the
evidence is insufficient when viewed in a
light most favorable to the verdict.'
Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992).

In their

appeal, Promax has again failed to marshall the evidence in
support of the trial court's decision and shown that the decision
was insufficient—even in a light more favorable to the trial
court's decision.

Promax basically sets forth their testimony

which supports their position by referring to the arguments
earlier in their appellant brief, and then stating that Mattson's
testimony must therefore be perjured.

As previously argued,

there was enough basis presented in trial for the trial court to
rule in Mattson favor.

Further, in the Heslop case, the Utah

Supreme Court was presented with a similar presentation of

unmarshalled evidence and favorable arguments for the appealing
party, and the court stated:
[W]e conclude that the [Appellant] has not
made the necessary showing. Although the
[Appellant] made an admirable listing of
evidence presented in the case upon which the
verdict was or could have been based, the
[Appellant]'s arguments merely refute the
credibility of this evidence and of
[Appellee] as a witness. The [Appellant]
does not base its argument upon the
insufficiency of the evidence supporting the
verdict. Instead it relies on other,
contradictory evidence that support's the
[Appellant]'s position . . . we [therefore]
will not invade the province of jurors to
determine [Appellee]'s credibility or to
reverse their decision.
Heslop, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992).

Because Promax does not meet

this requirement, the trial court's decision not to grant a
partial new trial should be affirmed.
Although Promax fails to marshall the evidence, the
arguments as presented above show there was sufficient evidence
for the trial court to decide in Mattsons' favor.
Finally Promax believes Mattsons' counterclaim was too long,
and they didn't receive appropriate discovery.

As stated above,

there was sufficient notice in the counterclaim that there was a
written agreement between Mattson and Curtis Johnson (Point II,
supra).

In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
[Appellant]'s counsel did make a request for
production of [documents] but never sought to
compel it, never moved for a continuance
based on the [Appellee]'s failure to produce
it, and did not explore the subject during
cross-examination. The [Appellant]'s counsel
could have obtained the same information by
propounding interrogatories to the
[Appellee]. He did not.

Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981).

There was no surprise

to Promax, the pleadings stated all the claims which Mattsons
wish to pursue, and Promax cannot now claim there was not enough
time to present their witnesses or pursue adequate discovery.
The trial court's decision to deny the motion for a partial new
trial should therefore be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs consistently misstates the standard of review
and fails to marshal the evidence.

The trial court's findings

are overwhelmingly supported by the evidence at trial. At trial
Plaintiff either failed to challenge the evidence presented or
their witnesses were not believed by the trial court.

The trial

court's findings of f a t , conclusions of law and judgment should,
therefore, be affirmed.

CROSS APPEAL BRIEF

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
'the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3) (j).

This matter was

assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) of
the Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Statement of the issue: Did the trial cost err in not
deciding that Mattsons were entitled to the benefit of their
bargain (an award of $140,000.00) when the trial court found
there existed a fixed cost contract between Promax and
Mattsons, and Promax breach the contract by exceeding the
contract by $140,000.00?

Standard of Review:

Whether Defendant's were entitled to

the benefit of their bargain is a question of law.

Conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference, but
are reviewed for correctness.

Scharf v. BMG Corp. 700 P.2d

1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

Statement of the issue:

Did the trial court err in not

assessing punitive damages against Promax when the trial
court found that Promax tortiously interfered with a
contractual relationship between Mattsons and Curtis Johnson
by wrongfully filing liens against Mattsons' property.

Standard of review:

An award of punitive damages is

generally a question of fact within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse
of discretion.

Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998 (Ct. App.

1989).

Statement of the issue:

Did the trial court err in not

awarding attorney's fees to Mattsons when the trial court
found that Promax tortiously interfered with a contractual
relationship between Mattsons and Curtis Johnson by
wrongfully filing liens against Mattsons' property.

Standard of review:

An award of attorney's fees is

generally a question of fact within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse
of discretion.
1996).

Salmon v. Davis County. 916 P.2d 890 (Utah

DETERMINATIVE LAW
None.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The statement of the case and statement of the facts are as
presented in Appellee response brief above,

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The trial found that Plaintiff agreed to build the Mattsons'
home for a fix cost of $190,200.00. The Court found that the
Mattsons eventually were forced to pay $330f000.00.

The trial

court erred in not awarding the Mattsons $140,000, the difference
between the fixed price contract and the total cost the Mattsons
had to pay because of Plaintiff's breach of the contract.
The trial court erred in not awarding Mattsons punitive
damages and attorney's fees when Promax's actions were a
malicious intent to interfere in a contractual relationship.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING THE MATTSONS $140,000,
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FIXED COST CONTRACT PRICE,
$190,200.00, AND THE TOTAL AMOUNT THE MATTSONS WERE FORCED
TO PAY, $330,000.00.
The trial court found that there existed a fixed cost

contract between Mattsons and Promax to build a home for the
amount of $190,200 (R. 778). The trial court also found that the
amount Mattsons overpaid in breach of the fixed cost contract was
(by stipulation at trial) $140,000. (R. 778). However, the trial

court did not find awarded the Mattsons the difference between
the amount they paid and the contract price of $190,200.
Marshalling all the evidence in support of the trial court's
decision is as follows:
MR. SMITH: "Judge, there was one question.
The ruling was that there was a malicious
interference with contract responsible for
$170,000. I assume that takes into account
the cost overruns; is that correct?
THE COURT: The $170,000 is the amount of the
loss for the sale, and as far as the cost
overruns are concerned, I conclude that the
parties received what they paid for.
Therefore, in my estimation there is no
damage claim back for that sum. . . .
(R. 779-780).

The evidence presented at trial, however, cannot

justify the court's conclusion.

There was a fixed price

contract, that contract was breached by Promax to the economic
detriment of Mattsons, and Mattsons were forced to pay, form
their own funds, $140,000.00 more than what they had bargained.
The Court of Appeals explained the general nature of contract
damages as:
Courts generally measure contract damages by
the lost benefit of the bargain, and
accordingly, "damages are properly measured
by the amount necessary to place the
nonbreaching party in as good as a position
as if the contract had been performed."
Anesthesiologists Assocs. of Ogden v. St. Benedict, 852 P.2d 1030
(Ct. App. 1993)(emphasis added).

Mattsons should therefore be

entitled to the benefit of the fixed cost contract, which should
be an award of $140,000.00 for the overruns paid out-of-pocket by
Mattsons.
Reviewing the evidence and the trial court's statement shows

that not awarding Mattsons the benefit of their fixed priced
contract bargain was clearly erroneous*

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AGAINST PROMAX WHEN THE TRIAL COURT
FOUND THEY MALICIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH THE CONTRACT
BETWEEN MATTSONS AND CURTIS JOHNSON.
The trial court found that Phil Bates: "maliciously and with

intent to harm interfered with defendants' prospective economic
advantage by directly thwarting defendant's opportunity to sell
their home . . . " (R. 779). However, although there was
malicious intent found in Promax's action, the trial court did
not award any punitive damages or attorney's fees; in fact, no
evidence can be marshalled to support the trial court's decision.
Generally, when a contract dispute sounds in tort (malicious
intent to interfere with one's economic advantage) a person can
recover punitive damages, and attorney's fees.
Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992).

Peterson v.

Because there was malicious

intent on the part of Promax and the trial court does not mention
punitive damages, it was error for the court not to assess
punitive damages against Promax.

CONCLUSION
Because Mattsons are entitled to the benefit of their
bargain, the trial court should have awarded Mattsons $140,000
for Promax's breach of contract, in addition to the $193,000.00
for tortious interference of contract and defective workmanship.
Also, because Promax's actions were done with malicious intent,
Mattsons should receive an award of punitive damages and

attorney's fees. Mattsons therefore request that, in addition to
the $193,000.00 already awarded by the trial court, judgment be
entered against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendants for
$140,000.00 for breach of contract.
damages and attorney's fees should

The issue of punitive
be remanded to the trial

court for proper determination of the amount.
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